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THE SEC'S PROPOSAL TO REGULATE MARKET
SWEEPS
In 1968 Congress enacted the Williams Act' to amend the Securities
and Exchange Act of 19342 (the 1934 Act) to regulate the acquisition of
publicly held corporations.3 The Williams Act authorizes the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules to protect shareholders
during takeover attempts. 4 The Williams Act and the SEC rules promulgated
pursuant to the Williams Act (Williams Act regulations), therefore, provide
substantive and procedural safeguards to shareholders of a corporation
whose stock is the subject of a tender offer. 5 A tender offer is a public
offer to purchase at a specified price during a fixed period of time all or
a portion of a class of a corporation's stock (target stock).6 In enacting the
1. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
3. See S. RaP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967). The Senate Report accompanying
the Williams Act explained that people seeking to acquire control over publicly held corporations
increasingly have used cash tender offers. Id. The Senate Report asserted that the increased
use of cash tender offers posed a threat to shareholders of target companies and, thus,
Congress should regulate tender offers to provide investors with protection from offeror's
coercive practices during cash tender offers. Id; see also H.R. RaP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d. Sess. 2 (1968)(describing increasing use of cash tender offer in market for gaining corporate
control and need for Congress' regulation of tender offers), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 2811, 2812-13; Note, Defining "Tender Offer" under the Williams
Act, 53 BRooKLYN L. Rav. 189, 189 (1987) (explaining that by passing Williams Act, Congress
intended to regulate acquisition of controlling positions in publicly held corporations).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also S. RPp. No. 550, supra note 3,
at 2 (noting that takeover attempts force shareholders to make investment decisions with
inadequate information); H.R. RaP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that takeover attempts
cause shareholders quickly to make decision to tender target stock without providing share-
holders with information about takeover attempt).
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982) (requiring any person acquiring beneficial ownership
of 5% of class of stock to file disclosure statement within 10 days); id. § 78n(d)(1) (prohibiting
person from making tender offer unless person makes requisite disclosures); id. § 78n(d)(5)
(providing shareholders tendering in response to tender offer right to withdraw tendered shares
in specified period); id. § 78n(d)(7) (guaranteeing that tender offeror pays all tendering
shareholders same price for target stock); id. § 78n(d)(6) (requiring offeror to purchase stock
on pro rata basis if shareholders tender more stock than offeror seeks); infra notes 21-29 and
accompanying text (discussing Williams Act regulation protection of shareholders during tender
offer).
6. See E. AANow & H. EnoRN, TENDER OFERS FOR COROATE CONTROL 69-70
(1973) (explaining that although Williams Act does not define term "tender offer," term
"tender offer" generally refers to public offer or solicitation to purchase during fixed period
all or portion of class of securities at specified price or terms for cash or securities); see also
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 682
F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). In Wellman v. Dickinson the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York used an eight factor test
1191
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1191
Williams Act, Congress recognized that tender offers pressure shareholders
of a corporation's stock immediately to decide whether to sell the corpor-
ation's stock on the open market, tender the target stock to the maker of
the tender offer (the offeror), or risk owning stock in a corporation with
new and unknown management.7 In addition to making tender offers to
gain control over a corporation, persons recently have used market sweeps
to gain substantial control over a corporation.8 A market sweep is a person's
attempt to purchase on the open market during or shortly after the termi-
nation of a tender offer a significant amount of a corporation's stock.9
to determine whether certain substantial purchases of securities constituted a tender offer.
Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 823-24. First, the Wellman court considered whether the offeror
actively and widely solicited public shareholders to sell the shares of an issuer. Id. Second,
the Wellman court determined whether the offeror solicited a substantial percentage of the
issuer's stock. Id. Third, the Wellman court ascertained whether the offeror made an offer to
shareholders to purchase the issuer's stock at a price above the market price, or at a premium.
Id. Fourth, the Wellman court considered whether the offeror's offer to buy the issuer's stock
was firm, rather than negotiable. Id. Fifth, the Wellman court determined whether the offeror's
offer to purchase the stock was contingent upon shareholders tendering a minimum amount
of the stock. Id. Sixth, the Wellman court considered whether the offeror limited the time
within which the offeror would purchase stock. Id. at 823-24. Seventh, the Wellman court
weighed whether the offeror pressured the offerees to sell the securities. Id. at 824. Eighth,
the Wellman court considered whether the offeror made a public announcement of a plan to
purchase the target stock before or contemporaneously with the offeror's rapid acquisition of
large blocks of the target company's securities. Id. After considering each of the eight factors,
the Wellman court stated, however, that a person's plan to acquire stock in a corporation
does not require the presence of all eight elements to qualify as a tender offer under the
Williams Act. Id. The Wellman court noted that the circumstances involved in a particular
case may cause one or more of the eight factors to be more determinative than the other
factors. Id.
7. See S. RE'. No. 550, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that tender offer forced pre-Williams
Act shareholders to make ill-informed investment decisions); H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note
3, at 2 (stating that absence of regulation of tender offers denies shareholders information
needed to make informed investment decision); see also Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp.,
774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d. Cir. 1985) (noting that Congress enacted Williams Act because limited
availability of tender offers forced average shareholders to make decision to sell on inadequate
information).
8. See Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securities and Related Activities Under-
taken During and Following a Tender Offer for Those Securities, Exchange Act Release No.
34-24976, 52 Fed. Reg. 37472, 37474 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-2, 14d-11)
(proposed Oct. 7, 1987) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release] (noting that people seeking control
over publicly held corporations increasingly use market sweep); see also Hanson Trust PLC
v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing use of market sweep to gain
substantial control of target corporation); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d
945, 947 (9th Cir. 1985) (recounting target corporation management's use of market sweep to
defend against hostile takeover bid); UV Indus., Inc. v. Posner, 466 F. Supp. 1251, 1255 (D.
Me. 1979) (describing shareholder's use of market sweep to gain substantial control over target
corporation). At least one court has referred to the substantial acquisition of target securities
outside of a tender offer as a street sweep. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
Nos. 341, 1987, 345, 1987, slip op. at n.3 (Del. 1987) (noting that to block hostile takeover
bid, target management declared dividend to shareholders to enable third party to engage in
street sweep).
9. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37474 (defining term "market sweep");
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Currently, the SEC does not regulate market sweeps, and courts have
refused to regulate market sweeps without explicit legislative or administra-
tive guidance.' 0 In response to the courts' failure independently to regulate
market sweeps, the SEC has issued for public comment Proposed Rules
13e-2 and 14d-11 (Proposed Rules) to provide shareholders with Williams
Act protection during a market sweep." In issuing the Proposed Rules, the
SEC claims that market sweeps and tender offers place the same pressures
to sell a corporation's stock on a corporation's shareholders and that
shareholders, accordingly, deserve the same protection during both tender
offers and market sweeps.'
2
In enacting the Williams Act Congress recognized that tender offers
pressure shareholders to decide to sell target stock without giving share-
holders the time or information needed to make a reasoned decision.'
3
During the 1960's, people seeking to gain control over a corporation began
increasingly to use the cash tender offer.' 4 Because federal securities law
did not regulate tender offers before 1968, offerors could pressure share-
holders to tender the target stock by operating in complete secrecy, buying
tendered stock on a first come, first served basis, and terminating the tender
offer at any time.' Because federal securities law before 1968 did not require
see also Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing market
sweep as existing when offeror makes substantial purchases of target stock immediately after
termination of tender offer); cf., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., Nos. 341, 1987,
345, 1987, slip op. at n.3 (Del. 1987) (defining term "street sweep" as rapid acquisition of
securities on open market during and shortly after pendency of tender offer for subject
securities).
10. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
courts' regulation of market sweeps would be usurpation of legislative or regulatory function);
see also SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that current law does not support regulation of market sweep as tender offer).
11. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37481-82 (publishing text of Proposed
Rules 13e-2 and 14d-11); infra notes 94-119 and accompanying text (discussing Proposed Rules
13e-2 and 14d-11).
12. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37474-75; infra notes 121-28 and accompa-
nying text (discussing SEC's argument that tender offer and market sweep impose similar
pressures upon shareholders).
13. See S. RP. No. 550, supra note 3, at 2 (noting lack of information available to
pre-Williams Act shareholders during tender offer); H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2
(describing how pre-Williams Act tender offer forced shareholders to make investment decision
without adequate information); 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams)
(stating that, absent regulation, shareholders faced with tender offer lack adequate information
to decide whether to sell shares of target stock or to tender target stock to offeror).
14. See S. REp. No. 550, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that use of cash tender offers as
method to acquire control of corporations increased tenfold in 8 years); H.R. RaP. No. 1711,
supra note 3, at 2 (noting increased use of tender offer in contests for corporate control); 113
CONG. REc. 24664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (claiming that cash tender offer has
become increasingly favored method of acquiring corporate control because tender offer is
cheaper and faster than proxy solicitation).
15. See S. Rat. No. 550, supra note 3, at 2 (describing how offerors pressured share-
holders to sell target stock by acting in complete secrecy); H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3,
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offerors to disclose their identity, their plans, or their financing, offerors
forced shareholders to make the investment decision without any knowledge
of the offeror, the tender offer's probability of success, or the possible
future of the corporation. 16 Because the offeror purchased the target stock
from the first shareholders to tender the target stock, shareholders who
immediately tendered stock were better able to sell the target stock to the
offeror than were shareholders who took time carefully to consider the
investment decision.' 7 Furthermore, because the offeror could terminate the
tender offer without notice, tender offers pressured shareholders immediately
to tender the target stock, instead of evaluating the likelihood that another
offeror would make a higher offer for the target stock. 8 After considering
investors' vulnerability during unregulated tender offers, Congress decided
that shareholders needed protection from the coercive nature of tender
offers.' 9 Congress, therefore, passed the Williams Act.
20
To protect investors owning target stock, the Williams Act regulations
require the offeror to comply with several regulations when making a tender
offer.21 First, the Williams Act regulations compel offerors to disclose to
shareholders information about the offeror and the offeror's intentions for
the future of the corporation (disclosure requirements). 22 Second, the Wil-
liams Act regulations require offerors to hold the tender offer open for a
minimum period of time. 23 Third, the Williams Act regulations require that
offerors guarantee that all shareholders tendering stock to the offeror will
receive the same price for the target stock, regardless of the tender offer
at 2 (noting that offerors free of restrictions of proxy regulation could pressure shareholders
to sell target stock); see also -113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (noting
secrecy in which offerors were allowed to operate when offeror announced tender offer).
16. See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that shareholders faced with tender
offer lacked knowledge of available options); H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2 (noting
that shareholders in tender offer situations lacked knowledge to make reasoned response to
tender offer).
17. See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that without knowledge of
offeror's plans, shareholders immediately must tender stock or risk that offeror will not buy
their stock); H.R. RaP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that shareholders who delay
tendering in hopes of better offer risk offeror's purchase of only first tendered stock).
18. See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that unregulated tender offers
force shareholders immediately to make uninformed decision to tender target stock or to risk
offeror's termination of tender offer before purchasing their stock); H.R. REP. No. 1711,
supra note 3, at 2 (noting that pre-Williams Act tender offer forced shareholders to forego
potentially higher offers for target stock because offeror could purchase only first tendered
stock and not stock tendered late in tender offer period).
19. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (explaining that shareholders are vulnerable
during tender offer).
20. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
21. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (explaining provisions of Williams Act
and how provisions protect shareholders from coercive tender offers).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1982); id. § 78(n)(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(d)
(1987); id. § 240.14d-2.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(1) (1987).
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price when a shareholder actually tendered stock (same price requirements). 24
Fourth, the Williams Act regulations dictate that offerors allow a share-
holder tendering the target stock to withdraw the shares if a better offer
develops and, thus, enable shareholders fully to consider available options
(withdrawal rights). 25 Finally, the Williams Act regulations require offerors
to purchase, pro rata, tendered stock and thus eliminate the risk that the
offeror will not purchase stock tendered late in the tender offer period (pro
rata purchasing requirement). 26 The pro rata purchasing requirement allows,
shareholders adequately to evaluate a tender offer before tendering target
-stock by permitting shareholders to tender target stock late in a tender offer
period?2 The Williams Act regulations insure, therefore, that shareholders
have the necessary information and an adequate amount of time sufficiently
to evaluate a tender offer.2 The Williams Act regulations insure, further,
that shareholders have an equal opportunity to participate in a tender
offer. 29 In addition to fashioning the Williams Act to protect shareholders,
Congress also fashioned the Williams Act to favor neither the offeror nor
the target management.3 0 By favoring neither the offeror nor target man-
agement, the Williams Act regulations provide the offeror and target man-
agement with an equal opportunity to solicit shareholder support for their
respective bids for control of the corporation.3
Although the Williams Act protects shareholders from an offeror's
coercion to sell target stodk, shareholders confronted with a tender offer
still endure market pressures that Congress did not intend the Williams Act
to alleviate. 32 When an offeror announces a tender offer, the price of the
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f(4) (1987).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(2) (1987).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(3) (1987).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(3) (1987).
28. See supra notes § 22-27 (describing procedural and substantive requirements of
Williams Act that provide shareholders with information and sufficient time to consider
information during tender offer).
29. See supra notes 22-28 (discussing Williams Act regulations that provide target
shareholders with disclosure and substantive rights during tender offer thus providing share-
holders equal opportunity to participate in tender offer).
30. See H.R. RaP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 4 (asserting neutrality of Williams Act);
113 CONcG. Rac. 24664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (explaining that drafters of Williams
Act avoided favoring either target management or offeror). Senator Williams, the co-sponsor
of the Williams Act, explained that the Act's increased regulation of tender offers was not an
effort to discourage tender offers. 113 CONG. REc. 24665 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
Congress recognized that tender offers provided a check on entrenched but inefficient man-
agement. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 4.
31. See 113 CoNG. Rac. 24664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams) (stating that regulation
of tender offers will provide offeror and management opportunity to present case for control
of target corporation).
32. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) (implying
that Congress did not intend Williams Act to alleviate pressures on shareholders caused by
forces of market place); SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 952 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating that only pressure on shareholders to sell was pressure of marketplace, which
was not type of pressure that Congress intended for Williams Act regulations to prohibit);
infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing risks associated with tender offers).
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target corporation's stock increases to reflect the existence of the tender
offer.13 Target corporation shareholders must decide whether immediately
to tender to the offeror all of the shareholder's target stock, to wait and
see if the target management or a competing bidder makes a higher offer,
to retain the stock, or to sell the stock on the market at the increased
market price.3 4 In deciding how to dispose of the target stock, therefore,
shareholders must evaluate the risks associated with tender offers. 35 First,
shareholders risk that the tender offer may fail.3 6 If the tender offer fails,
the market price of the target stock will decrease. 37 Target shareholders who
fail to sell the target stock on the open market not only fail to profit from
the tender offer, but also now hold stock of reduced value.3 8 Second,
shareholders risk that the target corporation's shareholders will tender more
stock than the offeror seeks to purchase. 39 If shareholders tender an excessive
amount of stock, the offeror must purchase the stock from all tendering
shareholders on a pro rata basis.40 If an offeror makes a pro rata purchase,
however, the unpurchased shares may decrease in value. 41 Most nonprofes-
sional shareholders lack the expertise needed properly to evaluate these risks
associated with a tender offer. 42 Many shareholders, therefore, prefer to
avoid the risks of the tender offer and sell the stock on the open market
for the inflated market price.
43
33. See E. ARANOW & H. ErHtoR, supra note 6, at 74 (explaining how market
professionals' purchases of target stock immediately following announcement of tender offer
increase market price of target stock); Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-
An Interesting Analysis, 21 CAsE W. REs. L. Rev. 609, 615 (1970) (noting that market price
of target stock rises after announcement of tender offer); Comment, Should Tender Offer
Arbitrage be Regulated? 1978 DUKE L.J. 1000, 1005 (noting that activity of professional
investors following announcement of tender offer causes market price of target stock to
increase).
34. See S. RaP. No. 550, supra note 3, at 2 (noting alternatives available to shareholders
during tender offer); H.R. RP. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 2-3 (evaluating options available
to shareholders confronted by tender offer).
35. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (outlining risks associated with tender
offers).
36. See E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 6, at 177 (noting that possibility of
failure of tender offer causes difference between market price and tender offer price); Comment,
supra note 33, at 1007 (explaining that market professionals purchasing target stock assume
risk that legal impediments or external economic influences may defeat tender offer).
37. See Comment, supra note 33, at 1011 n.56 (noting that market price for target shares
normally falls substantially following tender offer).
38. See id. (stating that value of target stock decreases after failed tender offer).
39. See E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, supra note 6, at 177 (explaining that shareholder
tendering shares in response to tender offer risks nonacceptance of target shares in pro rata
purchase).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
41. See Comment, supra note 33, at 1011 (stating that unpurchased shares of target
stock may decrease in value after tender offer if new corporate management implements plans
to freeze-out minority shareholders).
42. See id. (stating that evaluation of merits of tender offer, offer's chance of success,
and value of target stock as continuing investment requires degree of financial acumen beyond
abilities of average unsophisticated investor).
43. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 6, at 174 (noting that some shareholders
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In avoiding the risks associated with tender offers, however, shareholders
often immediately sell stock on the open market to market professionals,
known as arbitrageurs, who are willing to assume the risks of the tender
offer in anticipation of selling the target stock at a profit. 44 The arbitrageurs'
open market purchase of stock concentrates among relatively few share-
holders the ownership of the target stock.4 The concentration among
arbitrageurs of the ownership of the stock may, consequently, insure the
success of the tender offer. 46 The concentration among arbitrageurs of the
ownership of the target stock, however, may enable a person quickly to
buy on the open market, without making a tender offer subject to the
Williams Act regulations, enough of the target stock either effectively to
control the corporation or to wield sufficient power to block any competing
bids for control of the target corporation.
4 7
A tender offer's concentration of target stock among arbitrageurs re-
cently has encouraged some investors to use market sweeps, instead of
tender offers, to gain control over a corporation. 48 A market sweep occurs
when a person purchases a substantial block of the target stock on the open
market or through privately negotiated sales during or shortly after the
termination of a tender offer for the target stock. 49 Although the SEC
are unwilling to assume risks inherent in tendering stock and, thus, dispose of target shares
at favorable price in open market); Bromberg, supra note 33, at 615-16 (stating that shareholders
prefer to sell target stock on open market for guaranteed profit instead of facing uncertainties
of tender offer).
44. See E. ARAnow & H. EnmoRaN, supra note 6, at 174 (discussing role of arbitrageurs
in enabling shareholders who are unwilling to assume risks inherent in tendering to dispose of
target shares at favorable price in open market); Bromberg, supra note 33, at 615-16 (stating
that role of arbitrageurs is to buy target stock on open market after announcement of tender
offer); see also Comment, supra note 33, at 1011 (noting that option to sell to market
professionals allows shareholders to avoid risk of proration in event of excessive tender).
45. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37474 (describing concentration of target
stock among arbitrageurs following tender offer).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 8 (noting recent cases in which person seeking corporate control used
market sweep).
49. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37474 (defining term "market sweep");
see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., Nos. 341, 1987, 345, 1987, slip op. at
n.3 (Del. 1987) (defining term "street sweep" as rapid acquisition of securities on open market
during and shortly after pendency of tender offer for subject securities). In the Exchange Act
Release the SEC explains that three different classes of persons seeking to gain control of a
corporation may initiate a market sweep. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37475.
First, the SEC notes that an offeror may initiate a market sweep if the offeror thinks that
the tender offer may fail. Id. The SEC explains that an offeror sweeps the market after
prematurely terminating the tender offer or allowing the tender offer to expire without
purchasing the tendered stock. Id. The SEC states that under the tender offer regulations, the
offeror must terminate the tender offer before initiating a market sweep because the Williams
Act regulations prohibit an offeror from purchasing target stock outside of the terms of the
tender offer. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1987). Second, the SEC asserts that a target
corporation may initiate a market sweep to defend against a hostile takeover bid. Exchange
1988]
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claims that courts should afford investors subject to market sweeps the
protections of the Williams Act regulations, courts have refused to regulate
a market sweep as a tender offer. 0 For example, in Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp.5 1 Hanson Trust PLC (Hanson), announced a cash tender offer
of sixty dollars per share of stock for any and all of the outstanding shares
of stock of SCM Corp.(SCM).5 2 In response, SCM recommended that all
current SCM stockholders decline the Hanson tender offer.5 3 SCM an-
nounced, further, that SCM and Merrill Lynch (Merrill) had entered a
merger agreement.5 4 The SCM-Merrill merger agreement provided that a
newly formed corporation would effect a leveraged buyout 5 of all SCM
stock at a cash purchase price of seventy dollars per share of stock.5 6 In
Act Release, supra note 8, at 37475. The SEC explains that target management seeking to
block a hostile takeover bid may announce a plan to purchase a large amount of target stock
on the open market. Id. The SEC notes that because shareholders realize that the target's
defensive measures could defeat the tender offer, the target corporation's market sweep
discourages shareholders from tendering stock in response to the tender offer. Id. Third, the
SEC contends that a third party challenging the initial tender offer for corporate stock may
make a market sweep. Id. The SEC claims that if two bidders make tender offers for a
corporation's stock, one of the bidders may terminate the tender offer, sweep the market, and
gain control of the corporation. Id. The SEC asserts that the fear that the other bidder may
terminate the tender offer and sweep the market may force one bidder preemptively to sweep
the market, and, consequently, to circumvent the entire tender offer process. Id.
50. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
market sweep is not unconventional tender offer subject to tender offer regulations); SEC v.
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that market sweep
was not tender offer for Williams Act purposes and, therefore, purchases were not subject to
tender offer regulations); infra notes 52-93 and accompanying text (discussing Hanson Trust's
market sweep and Second Circuit's rationale for finding that open market purchases did not
merit Williams Act regulation).
51. 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
52. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1985). In Hanson Trust
Hanson announced on August 21, 1985, the corporation's intention to buy for sixty dollars
cash per share of stock all available shares of SCM stock. Id. On August 26, 1985, Hanson
filed with the SEC the documents that section 14(d)(1) of the Williams Act requires upon the
making of a tender offer. Id; see infra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining requirements
of § 14(d) of Williams Act). Hanson's tender offer stated that the corporation would accept
tendered shares from September 10, 1985, until September 23, 1985, unless Hanson extended
the offer beyond that date. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 51. Hanson's tender offer stated,
further, that Hanson might purchase additional shares of SCM in the open market, through
privately negotiated purchases, through another tender offer, or otherwise. Id.
53. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 51.
54. Id.
55. Id. A leveraged buyout is a transaction in which the purchaser invests little actual
cash in relation to the purchase price and an outside lender provides most of the purchase
price. H. BENJAMIN AND M. GOLDBERG, LEVERAGED AcQUISITINs S AND BUYouTs 11 (1987). In
some leveraged acquisitions the seller actually finances part of the sale by deferring part of
the purchase price. Id. The financers of a leveraged transaction do not look to the purchaser
for cash repayment of the loans. Id. Instead, the financers of a leveraged transaction look to
the assets and the cash flow of the acquired business as the source of repayment of the loans.
Id.
56. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 51. In Hanson Trust Merrill agreed to sponsor a leveraged
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response to the leveraged buyout agreement, Hanson increased its cash
tender offer to seventy-two dollars per share of SCM stock.5 7 Hanson
reserved, however, the right to terminate the new tender offer if SCM
created a lock-up device58 to block Hanson's tender offer. 9
Several days after Hanson announced its new tender offer, SCM and
Merrill entered a new two-step leveraged buyout agreement to deter Hanson's
attempt to acquire SCMA0 Under the first step of the revised leveraged
buyout agreement, Merrill would purchase for seventy-four dollars per share
of stock approximately eighty-two percent of SCM's outstanding stock s. 6
Under the second step of the revised leveraged buyout agreement, SCM and
Merrill would -merge after Merrill's initial purchases of SCM stock.6 2 The
revised leveraged buyout agreement provided, further, that the new corpo-
ration resulting from the merger of SCM and Merrill would exchange the
remaining SCM stock for debentures in the new corporation. 63 The revised
leveraged buyout agreement provided, moreover, that if an investor or
group other than Merrill acquired more than one-third of SCM's outstanding
shares, SCM would allow Merrill to buy SCM's two most profitable
businesses.6 Hanson, therefore, recognized that even if Hanson raised its
cash tender offer to seventy-four dollars per share of SCM stock to counter
buyout of all of SCM's securities to help SCM defeat Hanson's tender offer. Id. Under the
leveraged buyout agreement, the corporation resulting from the merger of SCM and Merrill
would make a $70 per share cash tender offer for 85% of SCM's securities. Id. If the resulting
corporation acquired more than two-thirds of the SCM shares, the agreement stated, further,
that the resulting corporation would acquire the remaining SCM shares in exchange for
debentures in the corporation resulting from the SCM and Merrill merger. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. A lock-up device is a contractual arrangement between an acquiring company
and a target company. K. BuALnN, A. FLEiSCHER & E. GREENE, NiNTH ANNuAL INsTITUTE ON
AcQtnSMONS Aim TAKEoVERS 53 (1987). The lock-up contract provides the acquiring company
an advantageous position over other prospective acquirors. Id. Originally, corporations used
lock-up devices to induce attractive, potential acquiring corporations, known as white knights,
to agree to outbid a hostile bidder. Id. Lock-up devices are generally either stock lock-up
devices or asset lock-up devices. Id. A stock lock-up device gives the acquiring corporation an
option to purchase newly-issued shares of the target corporation's stock. Id. An asset lock-up
device, like the kind in Hanson Trust, grants the acquiror an option to purchase an asset of
the target corporation at a specified price if the acquiror is unsuccessful in acquiring the entire
target corporation. Id.; see Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 52 (describing revised SCM-Merrill
merger agreement lock-up device that allowed Merrill to purchase two profitable businesses
from SCM for bargain price), see also infra note 64 and accompanying text (describing lock-
up device in Hanson Trust).
59. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 51. In Hanson Trust Hanson would recognize the existence
of a lock-up option if SCM granted to anyone an option to purchase SCM assets at a bargain
price. Id.




64. Id. In Hanson Trust Merrill and SCM agreed that the purchase price for the two
businesses would be $430 million. Id. Hanson, however, believed that the sale price was far
below the market value of the businesses. Id.
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the revised leveraged buyout, SCM would sell the two profitable businesses
to Merrill.65 Hanson recognized, further, that SCM's sale of the two
businesses to Merrill would result in Hanson's gaining control of SCM as
a substantially depleted and damaged corporation holding no substantial
assets. 66 Accordingly, Hanson terminated the cash tender offer and returned
all of the tendered shares of SCM stock to the tendering stockholders. 67 On
the same day that Hanson withdrew its cash tender offer, Hanson purchased
in two hours through privately negotiated transactions and open market
purchases twenty-five percent of SCM's outstanding stock.
68
In response to Hanson's purchases of SCM stock, SCM successfully
sought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York a temporary restraining order prohibiting for twenty-four hours Han-
son's acquisition of more SCM stock. 69 The district court subsequently
extended the temporary restraining order until the district court could
determine whether to grant SCM a preliminary injunction. 70 After conducting
an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting Hanson from purchasing any more SCM stock or exercising any
voting rights of the approximately 3.1 million shares of SCM stock that
Hanson already had acquired. 7' In issuing the preliminary injunction, the
district court reasoned that Hanson's purchases of SCM stock after with-
drawing its tender offer constituted a tender offer that violated section 14(d)
of the Williams Act. 72 Subsequently, Hanson successfully appealed the
district court's issuance of the preliminary injunction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 7
3
In reviewing the district court's issuance of the preliminary injunction,
the Second Circuit examined whether Hanson's purchases of SCM stock
65. Id.
66. Id. In Hanson Trust if SCM sold its two most profitable businesses to Merrill at a
price below the value of the businesses, SCM would lose valuable assets and receive no
comparable amount of money to replace the lost assets. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. In Hanson Trust Hanson, a British corporation, needed to comply with British
corporate law that required Hanson to obtain certain clearances before acquiring fifty percent
of SCM's shares unless Hanson made a formal tender offer. Id. Hanson recognized, however,
that British law allowed Hanson to avoid the requisite clearances by acquiring less than fifty
percent of SCM's outstanding stock. Id. Hanson could acquire up to one-third of the SCM
stock before Merrill could exercise the option to purchase the businesses. Id. Because the
revised SCM-Merrill leveraged buyout agreement required that Merrill acquire at least two-
thirds of the outstanding SCM stock, Hanson's ownership of nearly one-third of SCM's
outstanding stock would allow Hanson effectively to block the merger. Id. To acquire nearly
one-third of the outstanding SCM stock, Hanson, acting through its financial advisor, Robert
Pirie of Rothschild's, Inc., within hours of terminating its tender offer, purchased 3.1 million
shares of SCM stock through 5 privately negotiated cash purchases and 1 purchase on the
open market. Id. at 52-53.
69. Id. at 53.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 50.
72. Id. at 54.
73. Id. at 50.
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constituted a tender offer under the Williams Act. 74 The Second Circuit
recognized that the Williams Act does not define the term "tender offer.
'75
In determining what constitutes a tender offer, however, the Hanson Trust
court focused on the statutory purposes of the Williams Act. 76 The Hanson
Trust court noted that Congress enacted the Williams Act to protect
shareholders from the pressures of tender offers.7 7 The Second Circuit
acknowledged, further, that in deciding whether a particular party in a
transaction needs the protection of the Williams Act, courts must consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.7 The Hanson
Trust court explained that if a purchaser's failure to adhere to the require-
ments of the Williams Act would create a substantial risk that target
shareholders would lack information regarding the transaction, courts should
require the purchaser to adhere to the Williams Act requirements.7 9 In
considering all of the circumstances surrounding Hanson's purchases, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that Hanson's purchases did not constitute a
tender offer and, thus, did not trigger the Williams Act regulations. 0
In finding that Hanson's purchases did not constitute a tender offer
and, thus, did not trigger the Williams Act regulations, the Second Circuit
focused on seven factors." First, the Hanson Trust court noted that Han-
son's solicitations for stock were not widespread.' Second, the Hanson
Trust court recognized that Hanson purchased the SCM stock from highly
sophisticated professionals who had all of the information necessary to
74. Id. at 54.
75. Id. at 56.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 55. The Hanson Trust court explained that before the Williams Act, a bidder
could act in complete secrecy without revealing his identity, his plans for the corporation, or
his source of funds. Id. The Hanson Trust court noted that a pre-Williams Act shareholder
often recognized that a tender offer was available only for a short time and for a limited
number of shares. Id. The Second Circuit explained that the short duration of a tender offer
created market pressures forcing shareholders to race to be the first to tender stock and to
profit from the premium. Id. The Hanson Trust court explained, accordingly, that a shareholder
had no opportunity to search for the best price for his stock and, consequently, sold stock
without any knowledge of the purchaser. Id. The Hanson Trust court explained, further, that
the Williams Act insures that shareholders confronted by a cash tender offer for stock have
adequate time and opportunity to respond. Id.; see also supra note 15-18 and accompanying
text (discussing pressures of tender offers on shareholders before Williams Act).
78. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 57.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 57-58; see infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (explaining seven factors
upon which Hanson Trust court focused in determining that Hanson's market sweep did not
constitute a tender offer).
82. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 57. The Hanson Trust court explained that 22,800 shares
of SCM stock were available on the market at the time of the market sweep. Id. In the market
sweep, Hanson privately negotiated purchases of SCM stock from 5 shareholders and made I
purchase on the open market. Id. at 52-53. The Second Circuit noted that Congress directed
the Williams Act against public solicitations affecting a much larger percentage of a target
corporation's shareholders. Id. at 57.
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make an informed decision to sell the stock. s3 The Hanson Trust court
acknowledged, third, that Hanson did not pressure the sellers of the SCM
stock to sell their shares.8 4 Fourth, the Second Circuit noted that no
widespread publicity or public solicitation regarding the Hanson purchases
preceded the purchases. sY Fifth, the Hanson Trust court determined that the
sellers of the SCM stock received no premium above the market price for
their shares.8 6 The Hanson Trust court stated, sixth, that Hanson did not
condition its purchases upon obtaining a definite amount of the outstanding
shares of SCM stock, but instead, that the negotiation of each sale obligated
Hanson to buy the amount agreed upon regardless of the amount Hanson
sought to acquire.8 7 Finally, the Second Circuit noted that unlike most
83. Id. In Hanson Trust the Second Circuit determined that when Hanson bought the
SCM stock, the shareholders who sold the SCM stock to Hanson had access to the disclosure
statement that Hanson had filed with the SEC upon making the original tender offer. Id. The
Second Circuit noted, further, that the shareholders had access to the amended disclosure
statement that Hanson filed when Hanson raised the tender offer price to $72 per share of
stock. Id. at 58. The Second Circuit reasoned, further, that the shareholders had access to the
press releases explaining the basic terms of the SCM-Merrill revised leveraged buyout agreement.
Id. The Second Circuit noted, finally, that Hanson purchased the SCM stock from highly
sophisticated investors. Id. The Hanson Trust court concluded, accordingly, that the share-
holders who sold the SCM stock to Hanson had sufficient knowledge of the purchaser of the
stock, Hanson, and the financial condition of SCM so that the shareholders could, and did,
make an informed investment decision to sell the SCM stock to Hanson. Id. at 57.
84. Id. In Hanson Trust the Second Circuit reasoned that shareholders who sold the
SCM stock to Hanson faced market pressure rather than any pressure from Hanson to sell.
Id. The Hanson Trust court determined that Congress intended the Williams Act to protect
shareholders from coercive pressure from the offeror, not from the normal pressures of the
investment market. Id.
85. Id. In Hanson Trust the Second Circuit recognized that pursuant to New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) rules, Hanson reported its purchases of SCM stock on the NYSE ticker
and the Dow Jones Broad Tape. Id. at 52. The Hanson Trust court admitted, further, that
arbitrageurs might have been able to conclude from the NYSE ticker and Dow Jones Broad
Tape reports that Hanson was buying SCM stock. Id. at 58. The Second Circuit reasoned,
however, that Hanson's compliance with the NYSE rules should not constitute active or
widespread solicitation. Id.
86. Id. In Hanson Trust the Second Circuit noted that the market price for SCM stock
on the day of Hanson's purchases ranged from $72.50 to $73.50 per share of stock. Id. The
Hanson Trust court noted, further, that Hanson paid $73.50 per share of stock for all of the
purchases. Id. Hanson's purchase price was, therefore, at most $1.00, or 1.4%, higher than
the market price. Id. The Hanson Trust court held that because the SEC's proposed definition
of the term "premium" is the greater of $2.00 per share of stock or 5% over the market
price per share of stock, Hanson's purchase price did not represent a premium. Id.
87. Id. In Hanson Trust the Second Circuit noted that Hanson negotiated each purchase
independently of the other purchases. Id. at 52-3. The Second Circuit noted that Hanson did
not make its purchases of SCM stock contingent on its acquisition of a certain percentage of
the outstanding SCM stock. Id. The Hanson Trust court contrasted Hanson's purchases to
purchases under a tender offer when the purchaser purchases the target stock only after
shareholders have tendered a specified amount, of. the stock. Id. The Hanson Trust court
determined that Hanson had an obligation to purchase each of the blocks of SCM stock,
regardless of the total amount Hanson acquired. Id. The Hanson Trust court noted, further,
that SCM's evidence did not indicate that Hanson had a firm limit on the amount of SCM
shares that Hanson eventually would purchase. Id.
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tender offerors, Hanson imposed no time limit for the purchases.88 In
considering all of the circumstances surrounding Hanson's market sweep of
SCM shares, the Second Circuit concluded that a substantial risk that ill-
informed shareholders would make ill-considered sales of SCM stock most
likely did not exist.8 9 The Second Circuit held, accordingly, that Hanson's
privately negotiated purchase of SCM stock was not a tender offer. ° The
Hanson Trust court rejected the SEC's argument that federal securities law
should prohibit Hanson from purchasing SCM stock for ten days after
Hanson terminated the tender offer (cooling off period).91 The Second
Circuit determined that existing federal securities law did not support a ten
day cooling off period.9 The Hanson Trust court, therefore, concluded that
Congress or the SEC has the authority to create a cooling off period to
regulate market sweeps, but that the court would not usurp the legislative
or regulatory function by judicially creating a cooling off period.9
In response to courts' refusal independently to regulate market sweeps,
the SEC has published for public comment Proposed Rules 13e-2 and 14d-
11 to regulate market sweeps. 94 The Proposed Rules regulate the trading,
on the open market or through private negotiation, of stock that recently
was or currently is the subject of a tender offer.95 The Proposed Rules
apply to the actual purchases of a target corporation's stock, offers to
purchase a target corporation's stock, the making of arrangements or
understandings to purchase a target corporation's stock, and the soliciting
of offers to sell a target corporation's stock.96 The Proposed Rules regulate,
further, during a restricted period the trading of a target corporation's
88. Id. In Hanson Trust the Second Circuit determined that although all of Hanson's
purchases were immediate, Hanson imposed no general time limit on the purchasing plan. Id.
The Hanson Trust court postulated that if Hanson and one of the sellers had been unable to
agree on a sale price, the parties could have resumed the negotiations at a later time. Id. The
Hanson Trust court did recognize, however, that the arbitrageurs assumed that once Hanson
acquired nearly one-third of the outstanding SCM stock, Hanson would make no more
purchases. Id.; see supra note 68 (discussing Hanson's strategy to block SCM-Merrill merger).
89. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 58.
90. Id. at 58-59. Commentators disagree with the Second Circuit's holding that Hanson's
privately negotiated transactions and the open market purchase did not constitute a tender
offer. See Tyson, The Williams Act after Hanson Trust v. SCM Corporation: Post Tender
Offer Purchases by the Tender Offeror, 61 Tm,. L. REv. 1, 25 (1986) (criticizing Hanson
Trust decision); Note, supra note 3, at 208-09 (discussing Hanson Trust court's failure to note
detrimental effect Hanson's purchasing plan had on innocent shareholders).
91. Hanson Trust, 774 F.2d at 60.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37474, 37481-82 (publishing text of
Proposed Rules).
95. See id. at 37472-73 (explaining that Proposed Rules govern acquisitions of target
stock during and shortly after conventional tender offer for target stock).
96. Id. at 37476, 37481. In the Exchange Act Release the SEC explains that the Proposed
Rules apply to all activities that enable a person to acquire stock, regardless of whether the
buyer completes the acquisitions immediately or after the Proposed Rules would cease to apply.
Id. at 37477.
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stock.97 Under Proposed Rules 13e-2 and 14d-11(a), the restricted period
for the trading of a target corporation's stock begins when a person
commences a tender offer for a corporation's stock and continues until ten
business days after the scheduled expiration date of the tender offer. 9 When
a person commences a tender offer by public announcement, however,
Proposed Rule 14d-11(b) provides that the restricted period begins when an
offeror publicly announces the tender offer and continues until either the
offeror begins the tender offer by means other than public announcement"
or thirty business days after the offeror publicly withdraws the tender offer,
whichever event occurs first.'00
97. Id. In the Exchange Act Release the SEC asserts that because a tender offer creates
market dynamics that continue after the tender offer expires, the Proposed Rules also will
continue to apply after the scheduled expiration date of the tender offer. Id.
98. Id. Proposed Rules 13e-2 and 14d-l1(a) apply if an issuer commences a tender offer
under Rule 13e-4(a)(4) or if a bidder commences a tender offer under Rule 14d-2. Id. Rule
13e-4(a)(4) states that an issuer commences a tender offer when the issuer first publishes,
sends, or gives the offer to the shareholders of the target corporation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
4(a)(4) (1987). Rule 14d-2 states that a bidder commences a tender offer as of 12:01 a.m. on
the date that the bidder performs one of the specified means of notifying shareholders of the
tender offer. Id. § 240.14d-2(a).
Proposed Rules 13e-2 and 14d-l1(a) provide that the restricted period for trading the
target stock lasts for ten business days after the scheduled expiration date of the tender offer.
Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37477, 37481. If the offeror amends the tender offer
schedule to extend the time for shareholders to tender stock, the restricted period would extend
until ten business days after the amended scheduled expiration date. Id. The SEC reasons
that, because the scheduled expiration date of the tender offer determines the restricted time
period, a person terminating a tender offer before the scheduled expiration date could not
reduce the applicable restricted period. Id. at 37477.
99. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37482. In the Exchange Act Release the SEC
explains that Proposed Rule 14d-1l(b) applies only until the bidder commences the tender
offer by some means other than public announcement because the commencement of a tender
offer by other means will trigger Proposed Rule 14d-l1(a). Id. at 37478.
100. Id. at 37482. Under Proposed Rule 14d-l1(b) a bidder seeking to withdraw a tender
offer may make a public announcement pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b)(1). Id. Rule 14d-2(b)(1)
provides that if a bidder acts within five business days of the public announcement of the
tender offer, the bidder subsequently may announce the bidder's decision not to pursue the
tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)(1) (1987). The SEC notes that Proposed Rule 14d-1l(a)
restricts the activities of a person who announces a tender offer and subsequently commences
a tender offer by other means. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37478. The SEC
explains, further, that under Proposed Rule 14d-l1(b) an offeror who publicly announces the
withdrawal of a tender offer within the five business day period prescribed by Rule 14d-2(b)
would be restricted from buying target stock until thirty business days after the withdrawal
announcement. Id. The SEC notes that the Proposed Rules would affect a person prematurely
terminating a tender offer for a period equal to the twenty business day minimum offering
period applicable to tender offers plus the ten day cooling off period imposed by Proposed
Rule 14d-ll(a). Id.
The SEC exempts from Proposed Rules 13e-2 and 14d-11(a) a tender offer that a person
commences solely by public announcement under Rule 14d-2(b), because issuers and third
parties may not be able to identify some public announcements as tender offers. Exchange
Act Release, supra note 8, at 37476. The SEC explains, further, that if a bidder publicly
announces a tender offer under Rule 14d-2(b) by a press release, newspaper advertisement, or
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Both of the Proposed Rules regulate issuers'0 1 and affiliates'0 2 seeking
to acquire substantial blocks of a target corporation's stock. 103 Proposed
Rule 13e-2(a) regulates issuers who seek to acquire an aggregate of ten
percent or more of the target stock.104 Proposed Rule 13e-2(b), however,
regulates affiliates seeking to acquire an amount of the target stock that
would increase by an aggregate of ten percent or more any person's
beneficial ownership of the stock. ' 5 If an issuer or affiliate is subject to
Proposed Rule 13e-2, the issuer or affiliate must comply with the require-
ments of Rule 13e-4.'0 Rule 13e-4 requires that an issuer or affiliate making
a tender offer comply with the Williams Act disclosure, withdrawal, pro
rata purchasing, and same price requirements.107 Rule 13e-4 requires, further,
that issuers or affiliates making tender offers keep the tender offer open
for a minimum number of days and not purchase shares outside of the
terms of the tender offer. 08
In contrast to Proposed Rule 13e-2, Proposed Rule 14d-11(a) regulates
all persons, not just issuers, who seek to acquire an amount of a target
corporation's stock that would increase by an aggregate of ten percent or
more any person's beneficial ownership of target stock.' 9 Proposed Rule
public statement, issuers and third parties all may not receive notice of the tender offer. Id.
The SEC asserts, accordingly, that to apply Proposed Rules 13e-2 and 14d-11(a) to issuers
and third parties would be difficult to administer and add confusion to the market. Id.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(a)(1) (1987). Rule 13e-4 defines the term "issuer" as a
corporation that registers a class of equity securities pursuant to section 12 of the 1934 Act.
Id.
102. Id. § 240.13e-3(a). Rule 13e-3(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations defines the term
"affiliate" of an issuer as a person who controls the issuer, whom the issuer controls, or who
is under common control with the issuer. Id.
103. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37481-2.
104. Id. at 37481. Proposed Rule 13e-2(a) applies, further, to an issuer seeking to acquire
stock that the issuer can exchange for, or convert into, stock that will give the issuer any
right or privilege to an aggregate of ten percent or more of the target stock. Id. The SEC
notes that a bidder's announcement of a tender offer causes an increase in the volume of
trading of the target corporation's stock during the tender offer. Id. at 37474. The SEC notes
that the Proposed Rules apply to solicitations of offers to sell, whether the buyer of the stock
or another person would be the person conducting the solicitation. Id. at 37477. The SEC
recognizes, consequently, that brokers and dealers who solicit offers to sell the target stock
often will solicit offers to sell an amount of target stock that would represent an aggregate of
ten percent or more of the target stock. Id. The SEC asserts that because the Proposed Rules
focus on an increase in ownership instead of total ownership, the Proposed Rules will not
interfere with normal brokerage activity. Id. at 37477.
105. Id. at 37481.
106. Id.
107. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1987). Rule 13e-4 regulates issuer tender offers. Id. Rule 13e-
4(b) prohibits issuers or affiliates from engaging in specified deceptive or fraudulent practices
during a tender offer. Id. Rule 13e-4(d) specifies the information that issuers and affiliates
making a tender offer must disclose to target shareholders. Id. Rule 13e-4(f) subjects issuers
and affiliates making a tender offer to various substantive requirements, such as allowing
shareholders' withdrawal and same price rights, purchasing target stock on a pro rata basis,
and keeping the tender offer open for a minimum period of time. Id.
108. Id.
109. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37482.
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14d-1 1(b), however, regulates bidders seeking to increase by ten percent or
more any person's beneficial ownership of the target stock. 10 A person
subject to Proposed Rule 14d-11 must comply with the requirements of
section 14(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and the corre-
sponding rules."' Section 14(d) of the 1934 Act requires an investor to
make a formal tender offer upon the investor's acquisition of five percent
of the target stock."1
2
Although the Proposed Rules generally limit acquisitions of stock subject
to a tender offer, Proposed Rules 13e-2(c) and 14d-11(c) provide exceptions
to Proposed Rules 13e-2 and 14d-11." 3 First, Proposed Rule 13e-2(c)(1)
exempts from Proposed Rule 13e-2 an issuer's purchasing program that
target corporation shareholders previously have approved. 1 4 Second, and
similarly to the first exemption, Proposed Rules 13e-2(c)(2) and 14d-11(c)(2)
exempt from the Proposed Rules any person who purchases target stock of
a corporation to execute a merger or consolidation if the shareholders of
the corporation have approved the merger or consolidation."5 Third, Pro-
posed Rules 13e-2(c)(3) and 14d-11(c)(3) exempt from the calculation of the
aggregate increase in a person's stock holding under the Proposed Rules
the purchases of a block of stock that represents more than five percent of
the target stock if the seller reported beneficial ownership of the target
stock for at least one year before the sale of the target stock." 6 Fourth,
110. Id. at 37481-2. Under section 13d-3(a) a beneficial owner of a security is a person
who can exercise the investment or disposal of the stock. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1987).
111. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37482.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1987). Section 14(d) of the 1934 Act
regulates tender offers by owners of more than 5% of a class of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)
(1982). Under section 14(d) any person making a tender offer that would increase his beneficial
ownership of the target stock by five percent of the outstanding stock must comply with the
disclosure requirements of section 13(d) of the 1934 Act. Id. Section 14(d) gives, furthermore,
withdrawal rights, pro rata purchasing rights, and best price rights to target shareholders who
tender target stock to the offeror. Id.
113. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 34781-2; see infra notes 114-19 and accom-
panying text (delineating exceptions to Proposed Rules).
114. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37481. To qualify as a previously approved
transaction under Proposed Rule 13e-2(c)(1), the requisite number of shareholders as specified
in state law and in the corporation's by-laws must approve the transaction. Id. The SEC
reasons that by requiring the shareholders' approval, an issuer informs the shareholders of the
purchaser, the purchaser's plans for the corporation, the purchaser's offering price, and the
number of shares that the purchaser will purchase. Id. The SEC asserts, therefore, that if the
requisite number of shareholders approve the purchase, the shareholders possess the necessary
information to make a reasoned decision about the purchase. Id. The SEC reasons that the
process of procuring shareholder approval of the purchase adequately will protect shareholders
from coercive pressure to sell the target stock. Id.
115. Id. at 37481-2.
116. Id. In the Exchange Act Release the SEC explains that to qualify for the exemption
under Proposed Rules 13e-2(c)(3) and 14d-11(c)(3), the seller of the target stock must have
reported his beneficial ownership of the stock pursuant to sections 13(d) or 13(g) of the 1934
Act. Id. The SEC reasons that if the seller of the block of stock reported beneficial ownership
of the stock at least one year before the sale, the owner did not assemble the block of stock
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Proposed Rules 13e-2(c)(4) and 14d-11(c)(4) exempt from the Proposed
Rules purchases pursuant to a written agreement before the earlier of either
the public announcement of information specified in Rule 14d-2(c) 117 or the
occurrence of any of the events specified in Rule 14d-2(a)." 8 Finally,
Proposed Rule 14d-1l(c)(1) exempts from Proposed Rule 14d-l1 purchases
or potential purchases of target stock from the issuer." 9
In response to the SEC's request for comments on the Proposed Rules,
commentators supporting market sweep regulation (supporters) claim that
the SEC should regulate market sweeps for several reasons. 20 Supporters
assert initially that the absence of market sweep regulation frustrates the
shareholder protection policies of the Williams Act regulatory scheme. 21
as a reaction to or in anticipation of a tender offer. Id. at 37478. The SEC asserts that if the
owner did not acquire the stock as a result of the market dynamics caused by a tender offer,
the acquisition of the stock posed no threat to the target stock shareholders. Id. The SEC
reasons, accordingly, that a shareholder's sale of a block of stock that the shareholder did
not assemble in reaction to a tender offer poses no shareholder protection problems and should
be exempt from the scope of the Proposed Rules. Id.
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(c) (1987). Rule 14d-2(c) specifies the information that a person
making a tender offer by public announcement under Rule 14d-2(b) must disclose. Id. Rule
14d-2(b)(1) provides that the offeror must identify himself to the target shareholders, disclose
the identity of the target company, disclose the amount of the target stock that the offeror is
willing to purchase, and disclose the price or range of prices that the offeror is willing to pay
for the target stock. Id.
118. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37481-2. Rule 14d-2(a) enumerates the events
that signify the commencement of a tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(a) (1987). Rule 14d-
2(a) states that when the bidder first publishes the long form publication or a summary
advertisement of the tender offer pursuant to Rules 14d-4(a)(1), 14d-4(a)(2), or 14d-4(a)(3),
the bidder has commenced the tender offer. Id. § 240.14d-2(a). Under Rule 14d-2(a)(4) when
the bidder first publishes or otherwise provides to the shareholders definitive copies of the
tender offer, the bidder officially has commenced the tender offer. Id. Finally, Rule 14d-
2(a)(5) states that when a bidder in any way makes the tender offer known to the target
shareholders, the bidder has commenced the tender offer. Id.
119. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37481. In the Exchange Act Release the SEC
asserts that issuer sales and rapid accumulations of blocks of the target stock do not pose the
same problems to shareholders as do market sweeps. Id. at 37478.
120. See id. at 37475 (presenting reasons for SEC regulation of market sweeps); Tyson,
supra note 90, at 27 (analyzing Hanson Trust market sweep's negative affect on shareholders
and need for market sweep regulation); Note, Promoting Shareholder Equality in Stock
Accumulation Programs for Corporate Control, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 93, 114-15 (1986) (noting
unfairness of nonregulation of market sweeps); Note, supra note 3, at 208 (describing
inequitable treatment of unsophisticated shareholders resulting from unregulated market sweep);
Letter from Securities Industry Association to Katz, Commissioner of SEC at 2-3 (Dec. 9,
1987) (commenting on Proposed Rules) (available in SEC File No. S7-33-87) [hereinafter Letter
from SIA] (noting that public policy favors regulation of market sweep); Letter from Sullivan
and Cromwell to Katz, Commissioner of SEC at 1-2 (Dec. I1, 1987) (commenting on Proposed
Rules) (available in SEC File No. S7-33-87) [hereinafter Letter from Sullivan and Cromwell]
(supporting SEC's proposed regulation of market sweeps).
121. See infra notes 122-38 and accompanying text (discussing supporters' arguments that
market sweeps hinder Williams Act policies); supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text
(discussing Williams Act regulation of tender offers); supra notes 13-20 and accompanying
text (discussing reasons that Congress enacted Williams Act).
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Supporters argue that during both tender offers and market sweeps, share-
holders immediately must assess the likelihood of the outstanding tender
offer's or market sweep's success and the possibility that a competing bidder
or the target corporation management will offer a higher price.'2 Supporters
note that a shareholder selling to an offeror, however, rationally may assess
the tender offer's risk of failure because the offeror must comply with the
Williams Act regulations.'2 Supporters claim, further, that because a person
making a market sweep does not have to comply with the disclosure
requirements, shareholders involved in a market sweep must make invest-
ment decisions without any information about the purchaser, the purchaser's
financing, or the purchaser's future plans for the target corporation. 24
Supporters argue that because a person making a market sweep does not
have to comply with the minimum offering period, pro rata purchasing,
withdrawal, or same price requirements, market sweeps force shareholders
hurriedly to make investment decisions.125 Supporters claim, additionally,
that nonregulation of market sweeps favors arbitrageurs over nonprofes-
122. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37476 (noting decisions that shareholders
must make during tender offer or market sweep).
123. See Tyson, supra note 90, at 25 (explaining that Williams Act includes procedural
and substantive requirements to protect both ill-informed and hurried shareholders); supra
note 23 and accompanying text (noting that Williams Act regulation requires offeror to hold
tender offer open for minimum period of time).
124. See Tyson, supra note 90, at 28 (noting that market sweep forces shareholders to
make hurried, ill-informed investment decisions); see also Exchange Act Release, supra note
8, at 37475 (stating that shareholders selling target stock during market sweep sell without
adequate information or option to choose better offer).
125. See Note, supra note 120, at 111 (noting that persons making market sweeps purchase
stock on first come, first served basis, thus forcing target corporation shareholders to forego
Williams Act protections); Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37475 (stating that market
sweep forces shareholders to forego Williams Act regulation protections). Supporters argue
that market sweeps pressure all solicitees to sell target stock. See Tyson, supra note 90, at 27
(noting pressure that market sweep places on shareholders). Supporters contend, first, that
because the person sweeping the market may discontinue the buying program at any time,
market sweeps pressure shareholders who sell the target stock on the open market to the
arbitrageurs. Id. at 28. Supporters claim that if the person sweeping the market discontinues
the sweep, the arbitrageurs no longer will have a ready market for the target stock and will
discontinue purchasing target stock from the risk averse shareholders. See id. at 27 (noting
that arbitrageurs solicit sales of target stock as reaction to buyers purchasing large number of
shares of target stock at a premium price). Supporters assert, second, that market sweeps
pressure arbitrageurs to sell blocks of the target stock to a person sweeping the market because
arbitrageurs must act quickly, before the purchaser discontinues the purchasing program. Id.
at 31. Supporters claim that although arbitrageurs are sophisticated market professionals, the
Williams Act regulations protect arbitrageurs as well as nonprofessional shareholders. Id. at
27 n.139. Supporters claim, third, that market sweeps pressure shareholders because once a
purchaser commences a market sweep, arbitrageurs solicit stock from shareholders as the
arbitrageurs seek to assemble large blocks of the target stock. Id. at 27 (noting that in Hanson
Trust arbitrageurs solicited target shareholders to sell target stock so that arbtitrageurs could
sell stock to Hanson). Supporters note, therefore, that shareholders receive pressure to sell
target stock to arbitrageurs during a market sweep. See id. (recapping arbitrageur pressure on
shareholders during Hanson Trust market sweep).
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sional shareholders because arbitrageurs are the only shareholders with access
to information necessary to make an intelligent investment decision.
26
Supporters insist, further, that, although unaware of a sale of control,
minority shareholders are entitled to make an informed investment decision
and, thus, share in the opportunity to profit from the purchaser's offered
premium. 27 Supporters contend that because market sweeps create the same
pressures on and unfair treatment of shareholders that Congress adopted
the Williams Act to prevent, market sweeps should be subject to the Williams
Act requirements.
21
In addition to claiming that shareholders deserve Williams Act protec-
tions during market sweeps, supporters of market sweep regulation argue
that market sweeps discourage the use of tender offers because market
sweeps place an offeror at a distinct disadvantage to the target corporation
or a competing offeror. 29 Supporters note that during a tender offer the
Williams Act regulations prohibit an offeror's purchasing of target stock
outside of the terms of the tender offer. 30 Supporters claim that, accord-
ingly, an offeror is unable to counter a target corporation's or a competing
bidder's market sweep because the offeror is unable to purchase the target
stock except pursuant to the tender offer.' Supporters note that if a person
126. See Note, supra note 120, at 114 (stating that secrecy surrounding market sweeps
prevents minority shareholders from gaining information about possible market sweep, thus,
enabling arbitrageurs to obtain control premium); Letter from SIA, supra note 120, at 2
(suggesting that market sweeps place some shareholders at disadvantage to arbitrageurs because
nonprofessional shareholders lack adequate information).
127. See Note, supra note 120, at 115 (noting that arbitrageurs are only shareholders who
receive control premium for target shares in market sweep and that other shareholders should
have opportunity to share in profit of change of corporate control).
128. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37475 (stating that because tender offers
and market sweeps are similar and pose similar shareholder protection problems, Williams Act
requirements should apply to market sweeps as well as to tender offers); Letter from Sullivan
and Cromwell, supra note 120, at I (stating that to promote Williams Act's goals of protecting
investors, SEC should require large scale accumulations of target stock to occur through
formal tender offer process, instead of through market sweep); supra notes 122-25 and
accompanying text (discussing supporters' contention that because tender offers and market
sweeps are similar, SEC should regulate both tender offers and market sweeps).
129. See Letter from SIA, supra note 120, at 2 (stating that as practical matter, offeror
generally is unable to respond to market sweep because Rule lOb-13 prevents offeror from
purchasing target stock outside of tender offer during pendency of tender offer); infra notes
130-33 and accompanying text (discussing supporters' contentions that market sweeps discourage
tender offers by disadvantaging offerors).
130. See Letter from SIA, supra note 120, at 2 (stating that Rule lOb-13 prevents offeror
from responding to competitor's market sweep); Note, supra note 120, at 110-11 (asserting
that person making market sweep has distinct advantage over offeror because offeror cannot
purchase target stock except pursuant to tender offer); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1987)
(prohibiting offeror from making other purchases during tender offer).
131. See Letter from SIA, supra note 120, at 2 (noting that because of tender offer
regulations, offeror cannot compete with investor who sweeps market); Note, supra note 120,
at 110-I1 (explaining that unregulated market sweep disadvantages offeror in corporate control
battle because offeror must comply with Williams Act regulations and person making market
sweep need not).
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seeking control over a corporation initiates a market sweep instead of a
tender offer, the person may purchase stock in any manner to compete
with target management or competing offerors.' 3 2 Supporters argue, conse-
quently, that nonregulation of market sweeps discourages the use of tender
offers and encourages investors to act outside of the tender offer process.'33
Supporters believe that by bypassing the tender offer process, investors can
use market sweeps to change control of corporations but shareholders receive
no substantive protection provided in the Williams Act regulations.'
3 4
In addition to claiming that market sweeps frustrate the Williams Act
regulations and discourage the use of tender offers, supporters claim,
further, that market sweeps discourage competitive bidding and, accordingly,
deny shareholders the higher stock sale prices that accompany competitive
bidding.' 35 Supporters claim, also, that if a party involved in a bidding
competition sweeps the market and gains a controlling block of the target
stock, the party prematurely terminates the competition for the target
stock.'3 Supporters argue that by giving one party a controlling block of
target stock, the premature termination of competition for the target stock
discourages a competing party from making an offer at a higher price.
137
Furthermore, supporters assert that the possibility that one of the parties
in a battle for corporate control may sweep the market pressures offerors
to terminate a tender offer and pre-emptively sweep the market.'
38
Although many commentators support the regulation of market sweeps,
many commentators oppose the SEC's Proposed Rules (opponents).1 39 Op-
132. See Letter from SIA, supra note 120, at 2 (stating that competing bidder's market
sweep forces offeror to retaliate with market sweep).
133. See id. at 2-3. Supporters claim that because the SEC regulates tender offers but
not market sweeps, the lack of market sweep regulation encourages investors seeking control
over a corporation to use a market sweep instead of a tender offer to gain control of a
corporation. Id.
134. Id.
135. Cf. 113 CONG. REc. 24665 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits) (noting that shareholders
often profit from competing tender offers).
136. See Letter from Sullivan and Cromwell, supra note 120, at 2 (noting that market
sweeps preclude competitive bidding process).
137. See id. (suggesting that market sweep may foreclose potential offers for target stock
at prices higher than person making market sweep's price).
138. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37475 (noting that fear that competing
bidder or target corporation may commence market sweep may prompt bidder to commence
market sweep to prevent competing bidders or target corporation from sweeping the market
or successfully completing a tender offer).
139. See infra notes 140-67 and accompanying text (discussing negative comments sub-
mitted to SEC regarding Proposed Rules); see also Letter from Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers to Katz, Commissioner of SEC at 4 (Dec. 7, 1987) (commenting on
Proposed Rules) (available in SEC File No. S7-33-87) [hereinafter Letter from Council of
Economic Advisers] (suggesting that SEC withdraw Proposed Rules); Letter from Department
of Justice to Katz, Commissioner of SEC at 1 (Dec. 7, 1987) (commenting on Proposed Rules)
(available in SEC File No. S7-33-87) [hereinafter Letter from Department of Justice] (advocating
that SEC not regulate market sweeps); Letter from Executive Office of the President to Katz,
Commissioner of SEC at I (Dec. 20, 1987) (commenting on Proposed Rules) (available in SEC
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ponents argue, initially, that market sweep regulation is inconsistent with
the policies of the Williams Act. 4 Opponents contend that Congress enacted
the Williams Act to insure that shareholders confronted with a tender offer
have adequate information to respond to the tender offer.' 4' Opponents
assert that in a market sweep, however, the person sweeping the market
generally buys target stock from arbitrageurs.142 Opponents argue that
because the arbitrageurs are market professionals, arbitrageurs generally
have access to any information needed to make investment decisions and,
therefore, do not need the protection of the Williams Act regulations.
43
Opponents contend, further, that Congress enacted the Williams Act to
protect shareholders from an offeror's coercion to sell the target stock.
44
Opponents assert, accordingly, that the SEC should expand the Williams
Act protections to market sweeps only if sellers in market sweeps are
genuinely subject to coercive pressure to sell and cannot make well-informed
investment decisions. 45 Opponents claim, moreover, that because only a
few shareholders own sufficiently large blocks of stock to interest a person
initiating a market sweep, sellers have sufficient leverage to negotiate the
File No. S7-33-87) [hereinafter Letter from Executive Office of the President] (stating that
SEC should not regulate market sweep).
140. See Letter from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 3 (asserting
that market sweep regulation does not further Williams Act objectives); Letter from Department
of Justice, supra note 139, at 5 (discussing that Congress enacted Williams Act to protect
shareholders and Proposed Rules will not protect shareholders during market sweep); Letter
from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 1 (stating that SEC market sweep
regulation is inconsistent with Williams Act goals).
141. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (noting that
purpose of Williams Act is to protect shareholders by providing adequate information regarding
tender offer); Letter from Department of Justice, supra note 139, at 5 (stating that underlying
purpose of Williams Act is to protect shareholders from coercion of tender offers); supra
notes 13-29 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why Congress passed Williams Act and
procedural and substantive protection that Williams Act regulations provide to shareholders).
142. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (noting that
typical sellers in market sweep are arbitrageurs); Letter from Department of Justice, supra
note 139, at 5 (stating that in most market sweeps sellers of target stock are arbitrageurs or
large institutional holders who are sophisticated sellers); see also Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM
Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 52-3 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing sellers of target stock in market sweep).
143. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (stating that
arbitrageurs have greater access to market information than other investors); see also Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that sellers in market sweep
were highly sophisticated market professionals well aware of essential facts needed to exercise
professional skills in appraising offer).
144. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at I (stating that
Congress intended Williams Act to insure that shareholders are not required to respond to
tender offer without adequate information); Letter from Department of Justice, supra note
139, at 5 (noting that underlying purpose of Williams Act is to protect small shareholders
from pressures and related effects associated with tender offers); see also supra note 15-30
and accompanying text (discussing goals of Williams Act).
145. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (stating that
Williams Act procedures are means of protecting shareholders and SEC should extend Williams
Act regulations only if shareholders genuinely need protection).
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price of the stock and, if necessary, to gain more information about the
person making the market sweep.146 Opponents contend, consequently, that
most sellers in a market sweep are not subject to the coercion that frequently
exists during a tender offer. 47 Opponents contend, additionally, that Con-
gress enacted the Williams Act to protect shareholders while favoring neither
target management nor offerors.' 48 Opponents claim, however, that by
making it more difficult for arbitrageurs quickly to dispose of large blocks
of target stock, market sweep regulation will discourage arbitrageurs from
buying target stock. 49 Opponents argue that a decrease in arbitrage activity
will prevent the customary concentration of target stock among arbitrageurs,
thus making it more expensive, and accordingly more difficult, for an
146. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (noting that
because Congress passed Williams Act to protect innocent shareholders from coercion to sell
target stock, SEC should regulate market sweeps only to protect innocent shareholders); see
also Letter from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 3 (stating that because
market sweeps do not harm innocent shareholders, SEC should not regulate market sweeps).
Opponents note that shareholders confronted with a tender offer are subject to pressure to
sell because of the numerous potential sellers. Letter from Council of Economic Advisers,
supra note 139, at 2. Opponents assert that because an offeror can buy target stock in a
tender offer from many potential sellers, the sellers are not in a position to bargain over price.
Id. Opponents argue that during a market sweep, however, only a few shareholders hold
blocks of stock that are large enough to interest a person sweeping the market. Id.; Letter
from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 3. Opponents argue that because
a purchaser can buy target stock from a limited number of shareholders, the shareholders
have the leverage necessary to negotiate over price and request more information. Letter from
Council of Economic Advisers,, supra note 139, at 2; Letter from Executive Office of the
President, supra note 139, at 3. In fact, opponents claim that if more than one person is
attempting to sweep the market, the people sweeping the market quickly must acquire a
controlling amount of target stock before a competitor gains control over the target corporation.
Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 3; Letter from Executive Office
of the President, supra note 139, at 3. Opponents contend, therefore, that buyers, rather than
sellers, in a market sweep are subject to intense time pressure. Letter from Council of Economic
Advisers, supra note 139, at 2; Letter from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139,
at 3.
147. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (noting that
market sweep sellers are not subject to same time pressures as sellers in tender offer); see also
Hanson Trust, PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 58 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that sellers in
market sweep are not subject to pressure that Congress designed Williams Act to alleviate).
148. See Letter from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 3 (explaining
that Proposed Rules violate Williams Act principle of not favoring either target management
or offeror in market for corporate control); see 113 CoNG. REc. 24664 (1967) (statement of
Sen. Williams) (explaining that drafters of Williams Act avoided favoring either target man-
agement or offeror); H.R. Rap. No. 1711, supra note 3, at 4 (asserting neutrality of Williams
Act); supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent for Williams
Act regulation not to favor target corporation or bidder).
149. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (asserting that
market sweep regulation will limit arbitrageurs' ability to sell stock and will, consequently,
decrease arbitrage activity); Letter from Department of Justice, supra note 139, at 3 (arguing
that increased substantive and procedural constraints of market sweep regulation will discourage
arbitrageurs' purchases of target stock).
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offeror successfully to complete a tender offer.'50 Opponents conclude that
market sweep regulation will discourage the making of tender offers and,
thus, will favor target management over an offeror in a battle for corporate
control.' Opponents argue, furthermore, that the thirty day restricted
period for an offeror in Proposed Rule 14d-11(b)(2), contrasted to the ten
day restricted period for an issuer or an affiliate in Proposed Rules 13e-
2(a) and 13e-2(b), allows target management to purchase large amounts of
target stock on the open market twenty days before an offeror is eligible
to purchase target stock. 5 2 Opponents assert, accordingly, that the extended
restricted period for offerors favors target management over an offeror in
a battle for corporate control.
53
In addition to claiming that market sweep regulation fails to promote
the objectives of the Williams Act regulations, opponents state that the SEC
has no evidence that market sweeps hurt innocent shareholders. 154 Opponents
assert, in fact, that although a market sweep appears to treat nonprofessional
shareholders and arbitrageurs differently, all shareholders benefit from
nondefensive market sweeps. 155 Opponents note that SEC statistics demon-
strate that shareholders holding target stock until the person making the
150. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 4 (claiming that
market sweep regulation will increase costs and risks associated with holding of large blocks
of target stock, will impede concentration of target stock, and, thus, increase cost of tender
offers); Letter from Executive Office of President, supra note 139, at 5 (asserting that regulation
of market sweeps will decrease arbitrage activity and increase cost of tender offers).
151. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 4 (noting that
regulation of market sweeps increases cost of tender offer, which favors incumbent target
management by decreasing incentive to make tender offer); Letter from Department of Justice,
supra note 139, at 7-8 (stating that Proposed Rules favor target management); Letter from
Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 4 (asserting that Proposed Rules favor
target management over bidders).
152. See Letter from Department of Justice, supra note 139, at 8 (claiming that longer
restricted period for offeror favors target management in battles for corporate control); Letter
from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 4 (noting that Proposed Rules
favor target management in corporate control battle); see also Exchange Act Release, supra
note 8, at 37481-82 (setting out text of Proposed Rules).
153. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 3 (arguing that
Proposed Rules give target management initiating market sweep advantage over offeror
initiating market sweep); Letter from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 4
(stating that Proposed Rules' shortened restricted period for target management gives target
managment advantage over competing offerors in battle for corporate control).
154. See Letter from Department of Justice, supra note 139, at 6 (noting that SEC has
produced no evidence that market sweeps generally injure shareholders); Letter from Executive
Office of the President, supra note 139, at 2 (stating that although market sweeps treat
shareholders disparately, SEC has no evidence that market sweeps harm shareholders to extent
that shareholders need protection); infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's
lack of evidence that market sweeps harm shareholders).
155. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 3 (stating that
shareholders tendering target stock before a market sweep but selling target stock after failed
tender offer received premium comparable to tender offer premium); see also Exchange Act
Release, supra note 8, at 37479-80 (presenting statistics demonstrating that shareholders selling
target stock after a market sweep receive ptemium for stock).
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market sweep gains control over the corporation receive prices for the target
stock that equal or exceed the price that arbitrageurs pay to shareholders
before the market sweep. 56 Opponents assert, further, that because arbitra-
geurs pay shareholders a premium for target stock and shareholders are
able to avoid the risks associated with tender offers, market sweeps do not
harm shareholders selling stock to arbitrageurs. 5 7 Opponents recognize, and
the SEC concedes, that the only market sweep of the last few years that
harmed target shareholders was part of a target management's defensive
tactics adopted to defeat a hostile bid. 5 Opponents argue, therefore, that
in the rare case that a market sweep harms target shareholders, target
management activities are subject to state fiduciary law and the SEC does
not need to protect shareholders from a target corporation's market sweep.
59
In addition to claiming that market sweep regulation fails to promote
the objectives of the Williams Act and fails to protect innocent shareholders,
156. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 3 (stating that
shareholders disposing of target stock after market sweep gained premiums comparing favorably
with premium usually gained in tender offer); Letter from Department of Justice, supra note
139, at 6 (noting that statistics indicate that market sweeps initiated by hostile bidders generally
have not harmed nonprofessional shareholders); Letter from Executive Office of the President,
supra note 139, at 2 (explaining that SEC Chief Economist's study of four sweeps initiated
by acquirors demonstrates that target shareholders holding stock until after market sweep, on
average, did as well as or better than arbitrageurs selling to person making market sweep). In
the Exchange Act Release the SEC stated that the Office of the Chief Economist (OCE) and
the Directorate of Economic and Policy Analysis (DEPA) determined that during the past few
years there have been only a few cases of market sweeps that might have violated the Proposed
Rules. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37479. The OCE and the DEPA compared the
price of the target stock 20 days prior to the first announcement of the tender offer, the price
that the person making the market sweep paid to the shareholders selling stock during the
sweep, and the price that the person who successfully swept the market paid to the remaining
shareholders (the back-end price). Id. Of the five market sweeps initiated by a hostile bidder
the OCE and DEPA found that the back-end price was between 11% and 55% over the pre-
tender offer price. Id. The OCE and DEPA stated, further, that the premiums compared
favorably with average tender offer premiums at that time. Id.
157. See Letter from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 3 (noting that
shareholders selling to arbitrageurs do not need further protection because selling shareholders
get quick premium and elimination of risks associated with tender offers).
158. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37479 (stating that empirical evidence
does not clearly indicate whether defensive tactics accompanying market sweep or market
sweep itself harmed shareholders); Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139,
at 3 (noting that only case in which large open market purchase during a control contest
harmed target shareholders was case in which target management adopted defensive tactics);
see also SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1985). In SEC
v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. target management, Carter Hawley Hale Stores (CHH),
adopted a series of defensive tactics, including a large repurchase program, to defeat a hostile
bid. Id. at 947. The shareholders who did not sell the target stock to CHH, the back-end
shareholders, received a premium for the target stock that was less than I% above the pre-
tender offer price. Id.
159. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 3 (asserting that
because state law provides shareholders remedies for target management's breach of fiduciary
duties, shareholders challenging target management's harmful defensive market sweeps do not
need regulation of all market sweeps).
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opponents argue that the increased regulation of market activity will hurt
shareholders.160 Opponents explain that market sweeps occur because arbi-
trageurs obtain large blocks of target stock from shareholders choosing to
sell the target stock at a guaranteed profit rather than risk the tender
offer.' 6' Opponents claim that a person seeking control over a corporation
may choose a market sweep because a market sweep is less expensive and
administratively easier than a tender offer.16 Opponents argue, however
that the arbitrageurs' concentration of target stock ownership also provides
an efficient means of consummating successful tender offers. 63 Opponents
predict that if the SEC restricts arbitrageurs' ability to obtain or sell the
target stock by regulating market sweeps, arbitrageurs are likely to partici-
pate less in the market and will pay the risk-averse shareholders less for
the target stock.'6 Opponents anticipate, consequently, that market sweep
regulation will limit the shareholders' opportunity to sell the target stock
to arbitrageurs for a premium except when the shareholders sell the target
stock to the offeror.1'1 Opponents claim, further, that because target stock
no longer would be in the hands of a few arbitrageurs, a decrease in
arbitrage activity could deter tender offers. '6 Opponents argue that if tender
offer activity decreases significantly, shareholders will lose the opportunity
to profit from tender offers. 67
160. See Letter from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 5 (explaining
how restriction of arbitrage activity will decrease tender offer activity which will hurt share-
holders); Letter from Department of Justice, supra note 139, at 6 (asserting that by restricting
arbitrage activity SEC will impair ability of small shareholders to sell stock to arbitrageurs
and insure profit); infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (explaining how increased
regulation of market sweeps could discourage tender offers, which would harm shareholders).
161. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (noting that
arbitrageurs obtain large blocks of target stock from risk-averse shareholders). Arbitrageurs
serve an important role in the market because arbitrageurs reallocate to themselves risk of
shareholders unwilling to bear it. Id. By assuming the risks of a tender offer, arbitrageurs
provide the market with liquidity. Id.
162. See Zwirb, SEC Takeover Regulation Would Be Unwarranted, LEGAL TImEs, Jan.
20, 1986, at 20, col. 1 (stating that complexity and expense of Williams Act regulations
encourage persons seeking corporate control to avoid tender offer process and use strategies
such as market sweeps).
163. Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 4; see Letter from
Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 5 (noting that arbitrageurs purchasing
target st6ek from risk averse shareholders and selling target stock to offeror contributes to
liquidity and efficient functioning of capital markets).
164. See Letter from Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 139, at 2 (predicting
possible decrease in arbitrage activity as result of Proposed Rules).
165. Id. at 3; see Letter from Department of Justice, supra note 139, at 3-4 (stating that
although Proposed Rules do not regulate shareholders' sales of target stock on open market,
regulation of market sweeps will impair shareholders' ability to sell target stock on open
market).
166. See Letter from Executive Office of the President, supra note 139, at 5 (predicting
that market sweep regulation will inhibit arbitrage activity and, accordingly, may discourage
offerors from making tender offers).
167. Id.
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Although commentators present several arguments supporting and op-
posing the regulation of market sweeps, the SEC should choose not to
regulate market sweeps.' 68 Unlike an unregulated tender offer, a market
sweep does not coerce ill-informed shareholders hurriedly to decide whether
to sell target stock. 69 Generally, shareholders selling target stock in a market
sweep are arbitrageurs. 70 As professional investors, arbitrageurs have access
to any information needed to make an investment decision.1 7' Furthermore,
because so few shareholders own blocks of stock large enough to interest
a person making a market sweep, arbitrageurs who own large blocks of
stock have the leverage to gain any necessary information before selling
target stock in the market sweep.7 2 The sharehdlders who decide to sell the
target stock to the arbitrageurs before the market sweep are reacting to the
inherent risks associated with tender offers and not to any coercive pressure
that the person making a market sweep is applying. 7 Furthermore, Congress
did not intend the Williams Act to protect shareholders from normal market
pressures, only from coercion by offerors.1
74
The SEC should not regulate market sweeps not only because share-
holders selling target stock to a person sweeping the market do not need
extra protection, but also because all shareholders faced with a market
sweep appear to make comparable profits in market sweeps. 7 5 Shareholders
selling target stock to arbitrageurs before the market sweep profit from the
inflated market price and avoid the risks associated with the tender offer.
76
Shareholders who sell target stock on the market after the completion of
the market sweep typically sell the target stock for a price comparable to
168. See infra notes 169-85 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that SEC should
not regulate market sweeps).
169. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (discussing difference in nature of
pressure that tender offers and market sweeps impose upon shareholders).
170. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of market sweep
and noting that person engaging in market sweep buys target stock from arbitrageurs).
171. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting arbitrageurs' superior access to
investment information).
172. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing how arbitrageurs selling target
stock in market sweep have leverage over person sweeping market and, thus, can obtain
necessary information to make rational investment decision).
173. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing how risks associated with
tender offers, pressure shareholders to sell target stock to arbitrageurs).
174. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of Williams Act
being to protect shareholders from offeror's coercive conduct).
175. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37479 (noting that, on average, share-
holders selling target stock after market sweep gain premium comparable to market sweep
premium); supra note 154-59 and accompanying text (asserting that market sweeps do not
treat shareholders disparately).
176. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (describing increase in target stock's
market price following announcement of tender offer and noting that some shareholders prefer
to sell to arbitrageurs and avoid risks associated with tender offer); supra note 155 and
accompanying text (noting that all shareholders profit in nondefensive market sweeps).
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the price that arbitrageurs receive in the market sweep. 7 7 Although arbitra-
geurs may make more money in a market sweep than the nonprofessional
shareholders who sell target stock to arbitrageurs, arbitrageurs assume the
risks of the tender offer in exchange for the potential to make a larger
profit. 78 The structure of the investment market provides investors willing
to bear a greater risk with a greater opportunity for profit than shareholders
unwilling to bear the increased risk. 179 Accordingly, the investment protection
objectives of the Williams Act regulations do not exist in market sweeps
because shareholders have the information, the opportunity, and the time
to make a rational investment decision. 80
Finally, the SEC should not regulate market sweeps because, although
market sweeps theoretically encourage investors seeking control over a
corporation to work outside of the tender offer process, market sweeps of
the type that the SEC proposes to regulate generally are rare.' 8 ' Market
sweeps targeted for regulation by the SEC are unusual because few investors
have the capital to make a market sweep without having assurances that
the market sweep will result in future control of the corporation.8 2 The
SEC acknowledges that only five market sweeps of the last several years
would have violated the Proposed Rules.8 3 Four of the five market sweeps
potentially regulated by the Proposed Rules did not harm shareholders.
8 4
Thus, the SEC should not regulate market sweeps because market sweeps
do not occur often enough and do not have enough of a negative impact
upon shareholders to merit regulation.
85
The SEC should not extend the Williams Act protections and regulate
market sweeps because market sweeps are not a widespread phenomenon
and because market sweeps do not appear to pose serious threats to
177. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37480 (discussing statistics demonstrating
that shareholders who sell target stock after market sweep generally receive fair price for target
stock after market sweeps).
178. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that arbitrageurs assume tender
offer risks on assumption that arbitrageurs can sell target stock at increased price later).
179. See Zwirb, supra note 162, at 20, col. 3 (explaining that returns in financial and
capital markets are proportional to risk); Note, supra 120, at 115 n.138 (stating that in
securities market, investors bearing greater risk generally have greater potential return).
180. See supra notes 142-53 and accompanying text (discussing reasons that, unlike tender
offer, market sweep does not harm innocent shareholders).
181. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text (discussing rare occurrence of market
sweeps).
182. Letter from Bogen to Katz, Commissioner of SEC at 2 (Dec. 18, 1987) (commenting
on Proposed Rules) (available in SEC File No. S7-33-87)(noting that investors usually do not
make market sweeps because most investors cannot afford to purchase target stock without
assurances that purchaser can obtain control over target corporation).
183. Exchange Act Release, supra note 8, at 37479.
184. Id.; supra note 156 and accompanying text (explaining how shareholders profit from
nondefensive market sweeps).
185. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (noting infrequency of market sweeps
and market sweep's negligible affect on shareholders).
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uninformed shareholders. 6 SEC regulation of market sweeps will increase
the cost of making tender offers and give unwanted protection to arbitra-
geurs, arguably the investors who need the least protection.' 7 Because SEC
regulation of market sweeps would not prohibit risk-averse shareholders
from selling target stock in the open market, risk-averse shareholders will
continue to seek a risk free return for their stock."' SEC regulation of
market sweeps simply will make it more difficult for risk-averse shareholders
to obtain the risk free profit that risk-averse shareholders often seek.
8 9
Furthermore, SEC regulation of market sweeps would prevent a person
seeking corporate control from taking advantage of normal market dynam-
ics. 90 By extending the Williams Act protections to market sweeps, the SEC
would not prevent a person seeking corporate control from coercing share-
holders. The normal dynamics of the securities market will coerce the
shareholders to some extent and the Williams Act regulations cannot insulate
shareholders from all of the risks of the securities market.' 9' Yet, Congress
enacted the Williams Act specifically to protect shareholders during a tender
offer from an offeror's coercion to sell target stock. 92 Therefore, the SEC
would not promote the primary objective of the Williams Act by extending
the Williams Act protections to market sweep.
ANNE R. YUENGERT
186. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (noting that only five market sweeps of
last several years would fall under Proposed Rules); supra notes 155-57 and accompanying
text (stating that SEC statistics demonstrate that all target shareholders profit from market
sweep).
187. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (noting that market sweep regulation will
increase cost of making tender offer by decreasing arbitrage activity); supra notes 142-43 and
accompanying text (stating that sellers in market sweeps generally are arbitrageurs who are
sophisticated investors, and not innocent shareholders in need of Williams Act protection).
188. Letter from Chiappinelli to Katz, Commissioner of SEC at I (Dec. 5, 1987) (com-
menting on Proposed Rules) (available in SEC File No. S7-33-87) (stating that Proposed Rules
will not protect shareholders from unwarranted pressure to reach a hasty decision whether to
tender target stock because Proposed Rules, like Williams Act regulations, do not prohibit
shareholders from selling in open market).
189. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (explaining opponents prediction that
regulation of market sweep will decrease open market demand for target stock during tender
offer).
190. Cf., supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussing how announcement of
tender offer concentrates target stock among relatively few shareholders).
191. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text (describing risks that, despite Williams
Act regulations, shareholders face during tender offer).
192. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text (discussing tender offer practices that
Congress saw as coercive to shareholders).
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